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A profile of the non-executive directors of
Australia’s largest companies

This paper presents a profile of the non-executive directors of Australia’s largest
public companies. Using descriptive data, it assesses the extent to which these
companies adhere to the requirements set down in the Australian Stock
Exchange’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance.
In particular, board
structure and composition is evaluated, and levels of remuneration and
independence among non-executive directors are assessed. The paper concludes
with a discussion of perceived versus actual independence of non-executive
directors and the benefits of having non-executive directors present on company
boards.
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1.

Introduction
In the wake of high profile business collapses such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH

Insurance, and OneTel, and the increase in shareholder activism, public attention has
become more focussed on corporate governance (Petra, 2005; Peaker, 2003; Roberts
et al., 2005). A common feature of these corporate scandals has been an inadequate
system of corporate governance (O’Regan et al., 2005). Defined as the “system by
which companies are directed and controlled” (ASX, 2003, p. 3; Long et al., 2005, p.
667), corporate governance is concerned with, among other things, the “duties and
responsibilities of a company’s board of directors in managing the company” (Pass,
2004, p. 52).
Conflicts of interest between company directors and executives have prompted
both legislative and non-legislative reform aimed at safeguarding the interests of
corporate stakeholders and strengthening the independence of company boards
through the appointment of non-executive directors. Described as the “mainstay of
good governance” (Editorial, 2003, p. 287), non-executive directors are considered to
add to the integrity and accountability of company boards. Although efforts to define
the role of a non-executive director are said to have “taxed the nation’s finest
intellects” (Ham, 2002), non-executive directors typically participate in long-term
decision making, contribute external business expertise, identify potential business
opportunities, and monitor the actions of company executives (Pass, 2004; Long et al.,
2005; Higgs, 2003).
Much of the academic literature concerning corporate governance and board
composition in Australia and elsewhere has sought to establish causal relationships
between board structure and firm performance or sought to apply a theoretical
explanation for the behaviour of corporate boards. Kiel and Nicholson (2003), for
example, examined the top 348 companies in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX),
3

describing the board composition, examining the correlates of board composition, and
attempting to link board demographics with corporate performance. Sharma (2004)
studied the relationship between board independence and fraud across a sample of 62
Australian listed companies. He found that the presence of independent directors on
company boards, and the absence of duality (board of director chairman not also
being the CEO) significantly reduced the likelihood of fraud (Sharma, 2004).
Brennan and McDermott (2004) assessed the extent of independence of boards
of companies listed on the Irish stock exchange, profiling 80 company’s boards and
their adherence to the independence requirements set out in the Higgs Report. They
found that only 48 (60 percent) of the companies examined had majority-independent
boards. Brennan and McDermott (2004) noted that while directives such as the Higgs
Report may be a move in the right direction, based on the results of their study they
also stressed the limitations of using non-mandatory codes of conduct to achieve best
practice.
Interestingly,

Hooghiemstra

and

van

Manen

(2004)

proposed

“independence paradox” concerning the role of non-executive directors.

an
They

conducted telephone interviews and mail questionnaires to survey the opinions of
Dutch non-executive directors regarding their roles and limitations. They found that,
although non-executive directors are expected to operate independently from
management, in practice, they are unable to do so because they rely on this same
group to provide them with the information necessary for decision making, thus
leading to an independence paradox (Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004, p. 322).
In an examination of the characteristics of non-executive directors in the UK,
Pass (2004) conducted an empirical study of the 50 largest listed companies.
Gathering data on non-executive directors’ characteristics such as age, gender, length
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of service, remuneration, and other directorships, Pass’s (2004) study presented a
comprehensive profile of non-executive directors within large UK companies and
considered the consistency of this profile with the requirements and recommendations
contained in legislative reforms. He found that while significant progress had been
made in terms of meeting quantitative corporate governance requirements, such as
majority independence recommendations, qualitative characteristics related to
perceived independence and effectiveness continued to be questioned by
commentators (Pass, 2004).
Studies such as that conducted by Pass (2004) and Brennan and McDermott
(2004) were first suggested by Pettigrew (1992, p. 178) who argued that:
…the study of boards and their directors has not been helped by overambitious attempts to link independent variables such as board composition
to outcome variables such as board and firm performance. The task perhaps
is a simpler one, to…provide some basic descriptive findings about boards
and their directors.

Following the lead of Pass’s (2004) study, and keeping in mind the comments of
Pettigrew (1992), this research provides a descriptive profile of the non-executive
directors of Australia’s largest public companies. In the next section, the Australian
corporate governance framework is reviewed. This is followed by details of the
sample of companies examined and a description of the characteristics of the nonexecutive directors of these companies. Finally conclusions are presented, along with
research limitations and suggestions for future research.

2.

Background: Corporate governance in Australia
Corporate governance policy reform in Australia has primarily been a

response to both local and international corporate collapses, which were largely due to
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fraudulent behaviour and practices of key executives and inadequate corporate
governance systems. Even though the Australian corporate failures “lacked the global
impact of American failures like Enron and WorldCom” (Robins, 2006, p. 34),
Australian organisations such as HIH Insurance, and OneTel brought home the reality
of the larger, and more publicised, collapses of US organisations. The US response
was principally legislative, for example the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In Australia
the response has been a mix of legislative and non-legislative initiatives which have
included the development of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act, known as “CLERP 9”, the adoption of the
International Financial Reporting Standards, and the establishment of a Corporate
Governance Council by the ASX (Robins, 2006).
Work began on CLERP 9 in September 2002, with one of the key aims being
to restore public confidence in corporate Australia by strengthening the disclosure,
financial reporting, and governance framework within which Australian businesses
operate. Also at this time, the HIH Royal Commission, led by Justice Neville Owen,
was underway to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the failure of the HIH
Insurance Group.

The Royal Commission has had an important influence on

corporate governance in Australia with many definitions, models, and principles
considered by Justice Owen during his investigation. In sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the
HIH Final Report, Justice Owen noted the importance of corporate governance
structures that would not prejudice the interests of creditors, employees, and
shareholders, and that would ensure that these stakeholders have confidence in the
management of the business (HIH Final Report, 2003). The background, skills, and
expertise of board members were considered relevant to the development of good
corporate governance practices and Justice Owen stressed the importance of the
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presence of independent non-executive directors on company boards (HIH Final
Report, 2003).
Just prior to the handing down of Justice Owen’s HIH Final Report in April
2003, the ASX’s Corporate Governance Council released its ten Principles of Good
Corporate Governance in March (see Figure 1). These ten principles, and associated
recommendations and guidelines, were intended to optimise “corporate performance
and accountability in the interests of shareholders and the broader community” (ASX,
2003, p. 5).1 Recognising that not all companies have the same reporting and
disclosure requirements, and, consistent with the recommendations of Justice Owen
(HIH Final Report, 2003), the ASX Principles were not made compulsory, however if
a listed entity elected not to follow the recommendations, justification must be
provided.
Take in Figure 1

As shown in Figure 1, the second principle refers to the structure of the board
of directors. It is recommended that boards of listed organisations have a majority of
non-executive independent directors so that the board is able to appropriately
discharge its responsibilities and duties.

The purpose of non-executive director

independence, both actual and perceived, is to provide key stakeholders such as
shareholders and regulators with confidence that the director is sufficiently removed
from the management of the organisation and “free of any business or other
relationship that could materially interfere with the exercise of their unfettered and
independent judgement” (ASX, 2003, p. 19). Reiter and Rosenberg (2003, p. 1)
supported this argument by explaining that the true independent director is one who
“unconstrained by potential conflicts of interest will bring the sort of rigour and

1

The ASX Corporate Governance Principles have been updated and were to be effective from 1 July
2007, however the date for their adoption was postponed until 1 January 2008 (ASX, 2007).
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critical analysis required to limit recurrences of the debacles we have seen, and restore
investor confidence”.
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) suggested that an effective board is composed of
directors who are independent and competent and behave in manner that supports
these characteristics. Competence has been measured by reference to such factors as
years of experience, qualifications, and breadth of experience (O’Higgins, 2002; Pass,
2004). However ascertaining whether or not a director is truly independent is more
subjective and it may be difficult to determine the level of independence of particular
directors (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).

The ASX recommendations enable a non-

executive director to be classified as independent provided he or she is not a
substantial shareholder of the company, has not been employed by the company in an
executive capacity during the last three years, has not been a material professional
advisor of the company during the last three years, and has no material contractual
relationship with the company (ASX, 2003).2 However, while a director may meet
the ASX definition of an independent director, social relationships, friendships and
other forms of conflicts can compromise independence (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).
Young (2003, p. 2) defines this ASX-type definition of independence as “resume
independence”.
To examine the profile of non-executive directors serving on the boards of
Australian listed companies, the firms in the ASX 50 listing were selected. Details of
the sample and the data gathered are provided in the following section.

2

The ASX Principles (2003) state that an independent director is a non-executive director if he or she
is not a member of management. The data for this research were collected on the basis of this
definition, hence (if not made explicit in the annual report) where an independent director was not part
of the management team, they were considered a non-executive director, and where non-executive
directors were considered to be independent from management.
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3.

Empirical tests

3.1 Sample selection
Companies in the ASX 50 at 30 June 2006 (i.e., the 50 largest stocks by
market capitalisation in Australia) were chosen for analysis (ASX, 2006). A list of
these companies is presented in Appendix 1. The companies span nine industry
sectors, as summarised in Table 1.
Take in Table 1

As indicated in Table 1, the majority of companies were from the Financial sector
(38%), followed by Materials (20%), and Industrials (12%). Some of the entities
included in the sample, such as Macquarie Airports, Macquarie Infrastructure Group,
Mirvac Group, Macquarie Goodman Group, and Centro Properties, are listed as
stapled securities on the ASX and, therefore, do not have the same characteristics as
other, Limited companies in the sample. However, these entities have been included
in the analysis given that they are also subject to the same Principles of Good
Corporate Governance as other companies and to give their corporate governance
structures visibility.
The 2006 annual report for each company of the sample was obtained and,
consistent with Pass (2004), the following information gathered:
•

Non-executive directors as a percentage of total board of directors

•

Age of each of the non-executive directors, where available

•

Gender of each of the non-executive directors

•

Average time served by the non-executive directors on the company board

•

Remuneration of each non-executive director

•

Number of other non-executive directorships held
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The results from this analysis are presented in the following section.

4.

Results

4.1

Non-executive directors as a percentage of total
Across the ASX50 companies there were 350 non-executive directors from a

total of 438 board members.

Therefore, in total, approximately 80 percent of

company board members were independent non-executive directors.

The ASX

requirement that the majority of board members be independent from management
was met by all but one of the companies sampled. Publishing and Broadcasting
Limited (PBL), although it did list a majority of non-executive directors on its
company board, did not meet the requirement that these non-executive directors also
be independent. Of the twelve board members, four were executive directors, and
eight were listed as non-executive directors. However, of these eight non-executive
directors, only six were also independent from the company, meaning that only 50
percent of the company board was independent and that, therefore, the company was
in breach of the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance. In its corporate
governance statement within the 2006 annual report, PBL noted that it had not
followed the recommendations of the Principles in all cases and its justification for
the equal number of independent and non-independent directors was that it believed it
was in the best interest of the company to structure the board in that manner
(Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd, 2006). Other companies with a low percentage of
non-executive directors were Mirvac Group (63 percent) and Westfield (62 percent),
however these boards still maintained a majority of non-executive directors as per the
requirements of the Principles.
In comparison with the UK, it appears that Australian boards contain
proportionally more non-executive directors. The majority of companies studied by
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Pass (2004) had non-executive directors comprising between 50 and 60 percent of the
total board. It is also interesting to note the results of Kiel and Nicholson’s (2003)
examination of Australian corporate boards in 1996. Although their research involved
a sample of 348 companies and is therefore not comparable to the current study, Kiel
and Nicholson (2003) reported that the average proportion of non-executive directors
on Australian company boards in 1996 was 69 percent.

4.2 Age and gender of non-executive directors
The age of non-executive directors on Australian company boards ranged from
32 to 74, with the average age being 60 years. This result is consistent with Pass
(2004) who reported the average age of non-executive directors on the boards of the
50 largest UK companies to be 59 years. Interestingly, the average age of male nonexecutive directors (61 years) was somewhat higher than that of female non-executive
directors (53 years).
There were fewer female non-executive directors compared to males, with just
17 percent of company boards including one or more female non-executive directors.
This compares to Pass’ (2004) study which showed women represented 11 percent of
the total number of non-executive directors examined. Both these and Pass’s (2004)
results appear to be an improvement on the situation described by Li and Wearing
(2004), who reported that only 6 percent of non-executive directors in the top 350 UK
listed companies were female and suggested that women face a “second glass ceiling”
even after reaching board level (Li & Wearing, 2004, p. 355). Indeed, there were only
two female Chairmen serving on Australian company boards during 2006.3

3

Meredith Hellicar, Chairman, James Hardie Industries Limited; Margaret Jackson, Chairman, Qantas
Airways Limited.
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4.3 Time served by non-executive directors
According to ASX Principle 2, to be considered independent from
management, a director must “not have served on the board for a period which could
or could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with the director’s ability to
act in the best interests of the company” (ASX, 2003, p. 20). Therefore, it was
important to collect data on the length of time served by non-executive directors on
company boards. As shown in Table 2, the length of service ranged from less than
one year to 23 years, with the average time served by non-executive directors on a
particular company board being 6 years. In some instances, for example Macquarie
Airports and Macquarie Infrastructure Group, the corporate governance statement did
not disclose the number of years a non-executive director had spent on the company
board and these non-executive directors comprise the “not disclosed” column of Table
2.
Take in Table 2

This result is consistent with Pass (2004) who found that the average length of
service by non-executive directors was 5.6 years. However, the substantial length of
time served by some non-executive directors may reasonably be perceived to interfere
with the independence of these board members from the company and thus conflict
with ASX Principle 2.

4.4 Remuneration of non-executive directors
The ASX Principles provide that non-executive directors may receive
remuneration but that it must be disclosed clearly and adequately distinguished from
the remuneration applied to company executives. In almost all cases this Principle
was adhered to by the companies sampled. It is notable that the remuneration details
provided by the Macquarie Infrastructure Group and Macquarie Airports were
difficult to ascertain from the annual reports of these entities. Both these entities
12

noted that they were not required to provide a remuneration report within their annual
report but that they had done so in the interests of good corporate governance.
Despite this, the lack of clarity in the remuneration disclosures was significant.
The average remuneration of non-executive chairmen of company boards in
2006 was $423,714, while the average salary of all other non-executive directors in
that year was $139,458.4

In his 2004 study, Pass reported that the average

remuneration of non-executive chairmen in the UK’s largest 50 companies was
£222,000 (approximately A$466,000), while the average remuneration of all other
non-executive directors was £36,800 (approximately A$78,000).

Thus, in

comparison, while a position as non-executive chairmen on UK company board may,
on average, pay slightly better than on an Australian board, Australian non-executive
directors on average receive substantially higher remuneration than their UK counterparts.

4.5 Other non-executive directorships
There has been global concern over the incidence of multiple directorships
(Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2006). Although there may be some benefits of
multiple directorships, such as bringing to company boards access to key resources,
the Australian Shareholders Association has argued that any director who serves on
more than five boards is not acting in the best interests of company shareholders (Kiel
& Nicholson, 2006). The non-executive directors examined in this sample held an
average of three other directorships, with the largest number of other directorships
held being 9 (see Table 3).
Take in Table 3
4

The median salary for company Chairmen was $416,751 and ranged between $26,793 and
$1,147,000. The median salary for all other non-executive directors was $161,542 and ranged between
$10,986 and $608,000. It should be noted that the lower salary range for both Chairmen and other nonexecutive directors was paid to newly elected Board members who had served less than one year on the
company Board at the time the annual report was prepared.
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Many of these multiple directorships are held with other companies within the
ASX 50. For example, Ms Elizabeth Alexander serves on the boards of Boral Ltd and
CSL Ltd, and Dr Nora Scheinkestel serves on the boards of AMP Ltd, Orica Ltd and
Newcrest Mining Ltd.

Mr David Gonski, a non-executive director of Westfield

Holdings Ltd, is also the Chairman of Coca-Cola Amatil and a director of ANZ Ltd,
while Mr Don Argus serves on the boards of BHP Billiton Ltd and Brambles
Industries Ltd.

These overlapping relationships of directors across companies,

referred to as interlocking directorships in the literature, enable boards to remain
strategically aware of other company’s actions and may facilitate the development of
strong lobbying positions among major corporations (Murray, 2001).

5.

Summary and conclusion
This study has indicated that Australia’s largest companies are adopting ASX

Principles of Good Corporate Governance.

One of the key issues in Australian

corporate governance reform has been the appointment of non-executive directors to
company boards (ASX, 2003; Robins, 2006).

In this analysis of the 50 largest

Australian companies, of the 438 board members reviewed, 350 or approximately 80
percent were non-executive directors. However, despite the appointment of nonexecutive directors to corporate boards, concerns as to the actual and perceived
independence of these directors persist. While actual independence may be difficult
to ascertain without being privy to the nuances of boardroom friendships, social
relationships, and other forms of potential conflict, the perception of independence
may also be significantly compromised by the levels of remuneration received by
non-executive directors.

In the companies’ sampled, the average level of

remuneration of non-executive chairmen was $423,714 and, for non-executive
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directors, average remuneration was $139,458. The ASX Principles address this issue
by simply stating that the level of remuneration must be “sufficient and reasonable”
(ASX, 2003, p. 51). The subjectivity of these terms inhibits their usefulness as a
source of valuable guidance. A related issue was identified by Hooghiemstra and van
Manen (2004) as the independence paradox which arises due to non-executive
directors, in the course of fulfilling their responsibilities, relying heavily on the
information provided by the same executives from whom they are to said to be
independent.
A limitation of this study is a size bias resulting from only reviewing of
Australia’s largest companies. The research could be extended to include a random
sample of companies outside the top 50 and the examination could be conducted over
a period of time to obtain a broader perspective of corporate governance practices in
Australia. In addition, this study did not examine all 10 of the ASX’s Principles of
Good Corporate Governance. Further research in this area may seek to examine other
aspects of these Principles, such as the promotion of ethical and responsible decision
making (Principle 3), or the enhancement of management effectiveness (Principle 8),
or perhaps how or whether these two Principles overlap in decision making processes.
Future research could also incorporate theoretical perspectives such as network theory
used by Murray (2001) to explain interlocking directorships across company boards.
It is argued that the presence of competent non-executive directors on the
boards of companies is a significant benefit to the majority of stakeholders of
organisations, particularly shareholders and regulators (Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson,
2003). Non-executive directors can contribute significantly to organisations through
setting organisational strategy, monitoring the performance of and reporting from
executive management, and contributing to the development or removal of executive
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management. However, is the benefit to key stakeholders the result of directors’
independence, their competence or a mixture of both?

The lack of prescriptive

legislation in Australia, the fact that the current ASX guidelines are based on a
“comply or explain” philosophy (Higgs, 2003), and the absence of specific guidance
on the role of non-executive directors in the ASX guidelines means that concern over
the independence of non-executive directors is likely to continue.
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Appendix 1: ASX50 as at 30 June 2006
Symbol Company
Sector
AWC
Alumina Limited
Materials
AMC
Amcor Limited
Materials
AMP
AMP Limited
Financials
ALL
Aristocrat Leisure Limited
Consumer Discretionary
ANZ
Australia And New Zealand Banking Group Limited
Financials
AGL
Australian Gas Light Company (The)
Utilities
AXA
AXA Asia Pacific Holdings Limited
Financials
BHP
BHP Billiton Limited
Materials
BSL
Bluescope Steel Limited
Materials
BLD
Boral Limited
Materials
BIL
Brambles Industries Limited
Industrials
CNP
Centro Properties Group
Financials
CCL
Coca-Cola Amatil Limited
Consumer Staples
CML
Coles Myer Limited
Consumer Staples
CBA
Commonwealth Bank Of Australia
Financials
CSL
CSL Limited
Health Care
FXJ
Fairfax (John) Holdings Limited
Consumer Discretionary
FGL
Foster's Group Limited
Consumer Staples
GPT
GPT Group
Financials
IAG
Insurance Australia Group Limited
Financials
JHX
James Hardie Industries N.V.
Materials
LLC
Lend Lease Corporation Limited
Financials
MAP
Macquarie Airports
Industrials
MBL
Macquarie Bank Limited
Financials
MGQ
Macquarie Goodman Group
Financials
MIG
Macquarie Infrastructure Group
Industrials
MGR
Mirvac Group
Financials
NAB
National Australia Bank Limited
Financials
NCM
Newcrest Mining Limited
Materials
ORI
Orica Limited
Materials
ORG
Origin Energy Limited
Energy
PMN
Promina Group Limited
Financials
PBL
Publishing & Broadcasting Limited
Consumer Discretionary
QAN
Qantas Airways Limited
Industrials
QBE
QBE Insurance Group Limited
Financials
RIN
Rinker Group Limited
Materials
RIO
Rio Tinto Limited
Materials
STO
Santos Limited
Energy
SGB
St George Bank Limited
Financials
SGP
Stockland
Financials
SUN
Suncorp-Metway Limited.
Financials
TAH
Tabcorp Holdings Limited
Consumer Discretionary
TEL
Telecom Corporation Of New Zealand Limited
Telecommunications Services
TLS
Telstra Corporation Limited.
Telecommunications Services
TCL
Transurban Group
Industrials
WES
Wesfarmers Limited
Industrials
WDC
Westfield Group
Financials
WBC
Westpac Banking Corporation
Financials
WPL
Woodside Petroleum Limited
Energy
WOW
Woolworths Limited
Consumer Staples
Source: Standard & Poor's - Indicies S&P/ASX 50 (available at:
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/au/page.topic/indices_asx50/)
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Figure 1: ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance
A company should:
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight
Recognise and publish the respective roles and responsibilities of board and management.
2. Structure the board to add value
Have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its
responsibilities and duties.
3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making
Actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making.
4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting
Have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company’s financial
reporting.
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure
Promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning the company.
6. Respect the rights of shareholders
Respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of those rights.
7. Recognise and manage risk
Establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control.
8. Encourage enhanced performance
Fairly review and actively encourage enhanced board and management effectiveness.
9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly
Ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its
relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined.
10. Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders
Recognise legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.
Source: ASX, 2006
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